But we know that wealthier households tend to have lower rates of stunting. This is because higher household wealth can buy more and better food, clean water, improved sanitation and higher quality healthcare. It is not a perfect relationship by any means, but it is regular.
But what is happening to this disparity in
stunting rates across income groups as overall stunting rates improve? And the lowest wealth groups reducing
stunting more quickly than the highest wealth groups or is the opposite true? A
new paper using MICS and DHS datasets and authored by Caryn Bredenkamp and
colleagues, published in the International Journal of Epidemiology, answers
these questions.
The answers tell us something about the
pro-poor sensitivity of nutrition actions.
Countries that do better at reducing stunting in the wealthier rather than the poorer groups have nutrition plans that are geared to addressing the easier cases. Those that are better at reducing stunting among the lower socio-economic status groups have figured
out a way of reaching the poorest children in an effective way.
Which way is better? It seems obvious to conclude that the second
way is preferable. And work by Carlos Carrera and his UNICEF team suggests
that the benefit cost ratios are higher if we focus on the poorer groups. But is it so straightforward? First, every child has a right to avoid
stunting. Second, generating results in
the higher wealth groups may generate greater political support for stunting reduction and
result in more sustained funding to reach those in the bottom wealth groups.
Anyway, what did the authors find? Using a concentration index to summarise
stunting disparities across different wealth groups, they conclude:
* Out of 53 countries, 31 show no
statistical change over the past 10 years or so in the concentration
index. 11 countries show a widening in
inequality of stunting outcomes (many from South Asia) and 11 countries show a
narrowing of inequality of stunting outcomes (the Europe and Central Asia
region and the Middle East and North Africa region).
* Most sub-Saharan African
countries show a constant level of stunting inequality
But the concentration index is
a summary statistic. It can improve for
a variety of reasons, for example because the very poor are catching up with
the rest, or the middle level wealth groups are catching the wealthier but
leaving the poor behind.
When we examine
the data by wealth quintile the paper shows that for the countries where
inequality is increasing, it is because the wealthiest group is doing much better
than the rest in reducing stunting (India and Ethiopia are particularly
vulnerable in this regard).
For
countries where inequality is reducing, there are fewer consistent patterns:
sometimes it is because the bottom quintile is improving, sometimes the bottom
two quintiles and sometimes because the upper quintile is showing a worsening
level of stunting.
What are the policy implications of these
findings? The paper does not draw out
any, and that is probably because it is difficult, for the reasons given
above. Ideally we want all groups
improving, with public policy geared more to the poorest groups because (in
theory) children in the wealthier groups have more private resources to draw
on.
But for me this paper raises the question, yet again, of why we prioritise a stunting rate.
But for me this paper raises the question, yet again, of why we prioritise a stunting rate.
The stunting rate simply counts whether a
child is above or below the -2 threshold for standardized height for age (i.e. if ZHA <-2)
The equivalent in poverty measurement is P0,
the poverty rate. But as any poverty
economist will tell you the poverty gap (P1, or the average gap between income
and the poverty line) and the poverty gap squared (P2 or the average of the
squared poverty gap—even more sensitive to large gaps between income levels and
the poverty line)--are more meaningful measures of the poverty sensitivity of
policy and programmes.
I don’t know why
we do not calculate the average ZHA gap (S1) and the average ZHA gap squared
(S2) as well as the rate of stunting (S0). The mortality, morbidity and
economic consequences of being at -2.5 ZHA are surely more serious than being
at -2.1 ZHA. We care if a child moves
from -2.5 to -2.1, but it would still be classified as stunted.
If we calculated S1 and S2 we could understand more about progress and its distribution than we can with our current stunting measure (S0). I have seen it tried once, by Saul Morris (an excellent addition to the rapidly strengthening nutrition team at the Children's Investment Fund Foundation) but nowhere else.
If we calculated S1 and S2 we could understand more about progress and its distribution than we can with our current stunting measure (S0). I have seen it tried once, by Saul Morris (an excellent addition to the rapidly strengthening nutrition team at the Children's Investment Fund Foundation) but nowhere else.
Why not?
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